Preschoolers' selective learning from adult versus peer models was investigated. Extending previous research, childrenfromage 3wereshown to selectively learn simple rule games from adult rather than peer models. Furthermore, this selective learning was not confined to preferentially performing certain acts oneself, but more specifically had anormative dimension to it: children understood the waythe adult demonstrated an act not only as the better one,b ut as the normativelya ppropriate/correct one.T his was indicated in their spontaneous normative interventions (protest, critique,e tc.) in response to third party acts deviating from the one demonstrated by the adult model. Various interpretations of these findings ared iscussed in the broader context of the development of children'ssocial cognition and cultural learning.
not only use the object in similar ways themselves later on, but only use it fort his purposea nd assume other people will do so as well, and tend to use only this object (rathert han differento nes)f or this purpose ( Casler &K elemen, 2005) . One rich interpretation of this phenomenon is that it indicates that children not only understand what the otherperson was up to,but understandhow one appropriatelyacts with the tool because that is what it is for .
Assessingnormative issuesmore directly,arecent series of studies has documented early normative learning in the domain of playing games.Inthese studies, children from age2not only imitatively acquired new (game)a ctions, but indicated that they understood these actions in normative terms as rule-governedb ye nforcing the rules towards third parties: in particular,theynormatively responded to third party deviations from this demonstrated way to play the game (Rakoczy,2 008; Rakoczy,B rosche, Warneken, &T omasello, 2009; Rakoczy,W arneken, &T omasello, 2008; Wyman, Rakoczy,&Tomasello, 2009) .
But how sophisticated, flexible, and selective is such precocious normative learning? Do young children flexibly track and take into account relevant aspects of the context, of the type of activity(andthe potential mistakes related to it), and of the kind of model when learning normatively structured activities?
Some recent researchs uggests that young children seemt ob ea lready relatively flexible in that theyu nderstand the rudiments of the context-relativity typicalofm any normative practices (e.g., what countsasabrutal foul in soccerisjust aregular attackin rugby). In several of the studies mentioned above, fore xample, children from age2 protested against an act by apuppetthat constituted amistake in the context of agame, but did not do so in responset ot he very same act when the puppet had changed the context beforehand, e.g., by announcing that she wasn ot going to play the game (Rakoczy et al., Furthermore, young childrens eemt ob efl exible in that theyd istinguish between different kinds of mistakes (e.g., action mistakes, verbalmistakes) and track accordingly who is to be criticized in which ways (e.g., wrongdoersf or acting wrongly vs. wrongsayersf or speakingw rongly; Rakoczy &T omasello, in press) and distinguish between differentk inds of norms (conventional vs. moral) in differentd omains (Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983) .
Beyond such rudimentary flexibility,h owever,i ti sc rucial form ature cultural normative learning to takei nto account the quality of differentp otential models. In particular, given the arbitrariness andt herefore opacityo fm ostc ulturala nd conventional affairs(which makeexternal checks hard to come by or even impossible), learning cultural affairsselectively from competent senior membersoft he community (rathert han from anyone) is ac rucial milestone in becoming ac ompetent membero f the culture oneself. 1 Selectivity in (non-normative) learning from different kinds of modelshas been the focus of much recent researchi ns ocial cognitive development (for overviews, see Harris, 2007; Koenig &H arris, 2005a) .N umerous studies have revealed that children from around 3to4yearstakeinto account differentmodel characteristics whenhaving to select among two models in novel word learning situations. Fore xample, children have been found to selectively learnf rom models that express knowledgea nd/or certainty (Birch, Frampton, &Akmal, 2006; Koenig &Harris, 2005b; Matsui, Yamamoto, &M cCagg, 2006; Moore, Bryant, &F urrow,1 989; Sabbagh &B aldwin, 2001) .
Probably the best documented achievement of preschoolers in this context is their ability to track and take into account the varying reliability of differenta gents. When children first witnesstwo agents one of whom proves reliable in naming familiar objects while the other proves unreliable, and then can choose between the two agents in learning novel words fornovel objects, 4-year-olds (and sometimes 3-year-olds)prefer the previouslyreliable agent (Clé ment, Jaswal &Neely,2006; Koenig &Harris, 2005b; Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, &Harris, 2007) .A nd this selectivity in young childrens eems to extend to normative learning: children in one recent study did not only learntoplay anovel game differentially from a reliable model (in contrast to an unreliable one), but considered the wayt he reliable model didi ti nn ormative terms as the appropriate/correct way (asi ndicated in their protest against the unreliablemodel; Rakoczy,W arneken, &T omasello, 2009).
However,i ne veryday situations of cultural learning therei sf requentlyh ardly any explicit information aboutthe certainty, competence,orreliability of potential models. In the absenceofany such overte xpression (e.g., of certainty) or any previous history (of competence), one model characteristict hat supplies ag oodh euristicb asis for selective learning is age:prima facie, in most domains adults are morereliable members of aculture and thus knowmore about cultural affairs than children do. Consequently, ag ood default strategy,i np articular when it comes to arbitrarya nd therefore opaque conventional activities, is to selectively learnf rom adults rather than from peers. And recent researchhas just begun to documentsuch adefault preference in young children in the domain of learning novel words (Jaswal &N eely,2 006).W ithout any further information,children in this study tended to learnnovel words from adults rather than from peers. And this selective learning proved quite flexible, in that it could be reversed under appropriate circumstances: whena dults proved unreliable over time, children began to prefer more reliable peersover unreliable adults (Jaswal &N eely,2 006).
But from these studies,itremains unclear how general aphenomenon such selective learning is: does it extend beyond the arguably quite special domain of word learning? And it also remains unclear what this kind of selective learning is based on: do children just prefer some models (adults) and mimic their idiosyncratic acts? Or do they understand adult model acts as akind of command 'Do it like this!' to be obeyed? Such accounts employ lower-level explanations of selective learning in that children's preference forcertain kinds of models is not seen as based on differential presumptions of competence nor on considerations concerning conventionality or normativity.
Alternatively, is it that, in contrast to such rather lower-level explanations,y oung children view the adult as transmitting some general cultural information with conventional and normative structure: 'This is how this action goes, this is how we do it'.
Ac rucial wayt ot est between these differentp ossibilities is to look at children's behaviour not only in the first person (who does the child imitate herself),b ut in responsetothird person actions. Would children expect otherstoact as the adult model did (revealing an assumption of conventionality,s ee, e.g., Diesendruck &M arkson, 2001) ?And crucially, would theycriticizeothersinthe case of actions deviating from the ones modelled by the adult (indicatingtheyviewthe actions as normativelystructured)?
In sum, preschoolchildren have on the one hand been shown to be cultural normative learners,acquiring from adult models normativelystructured formsofaction (this becomes clearest in children'sprotest against third party mistakes).But we do not know yethow systematic and selective such normative learning is. On the other hand, preschoolershave been showntobesystematic and selective in their learning of words from others( preferring reliable over unreliablem odels, adults over peers, etc.). It remains to be seen, however,how general such selectivity is (beyond the domain of word learning),a nd how it is to be characterized exactly -i np articular,w hether it involves any normative awareness (of the selectively imitated act as the correct one).
The present work, therefore, aims at addressing these questions by investigating young children'sselective normative learning from models of differentage.T othis aim, children'ss elective acquisition of conventional activities (beyond just linguistic learning) from adult versusp eer models was studied. As the earliestc ompetence in selective learning of linguistic labels as afunction of model documented in the literature is in children aged 3-4 (Jaswal &Neely,2006;K oenig &Harris, 2005b), we focused on this critical ager angea nd tested children at 3and 4y ears.
Children were presented with video clips of an adult and apeermodel. In the novel label tasks taken from previousr esearch, the two models labelled novel objects differentlyw ith novel labels and children were then askedw hat the object was called (following Jaswal &N eely,2 006). In the novel game tasks,t he two models demonstratedhow to play simple games in differentways. Children werethen allowed to play the games themselves, and their selective imitation wasinvestigated. To test for normative awareness,c hildren'ss pontaneous responses to at hird party (a puppet) playing the game in either of the two ways weret hen recorded.T he logic is the following: if children see the way of playing the game shown by one model in normative terms as the appropriate, correct one, then theyshould not only selectively imitate this way,b ut protest when the third party plays differently.
Method
Participants Twenty-four 3-year-old children(10 males, 14 females, M ¼ 2;11,range ¼ 2 ; 9-3 ; 3) and twenty-four 4-year-old children (13 males,1 1f emales, M ¼ 4; 0, range ¼ 3 ; 10 -4; 2) were included in the final sample. Four additional children were excluded from the study due to experimentalerror ( N ¼ 3), or because theywere uncooperative(N ¼ 1). All children were native German speakersa nd recruited in urband ay-care centres. Theyc ame from mixed socio-economicalb ackgrounds.
Design and procedure All children were tested individually in their day-care centres. All testing was done by two experimentersi naq uietr oom. Each sessionw as videotaped and lasted approximately 30 min. For all children, as ession consisted of (i) as hortw arm-up, (ii) ab lock of four novel labeltasks, and (iii) and ab lock of four novel game tasks.
Warm-up
There was ageneral warm-up in which the first experimenter (E1)played with the child until she felt comfortable, followed by aspecific warm-up in which the puppetthat E2 played was introduced. E2 brought out ahand puppet called 'Max' which she animated and introduced to the child. E1, Max and the child then played with aball and other toys to make the child feel comfortable with the puppet. Then E1, the child and the puppet took turns in performing simple instrumentala ctions (e.g., drawing) and the puppet committed some instrumental mistakes (e.g., took amalfunctioning pen). The rationale fort his wast og ive children, particularly shy ones,t ime to familiarize themselves with situations where mistakes happen and theyc an intervene.
Novel label tasks
After the warm-up, E1 introduced the child to alaptop computer and two actorsshown on the screen -a4-year-old male child and am ale adult. She told the child the actors' names and played ashortmovie where the informantsintroduced themselves. In each of the four subsequent novel label trials, E1 first showed the child anovel object (mostly unfamiliar objectsfrom hardware stores) and asked her whether she knew what it was. Usually children answered 'no', but if theyclaimed, e.g., 'yes, that'sascrew', theywere allowed to explore the object and were corrected. E1 then said, 'Okay,solet'swatch a movie'a nd startedavideo clip in which the two actorsl abelled the same object with different novel words (e.g., 'doso' vs. 'toma'). Astill imageofthe two actorsremained on the screen, and E1 asked the test question: 'So, tell me … (name of the child),what is this?' (points to the novelobject). If the child did not answer,E1askedthe forced choice question (e.g., 'Is it ad oso or at oma?'). Acrossc hildren, it wass ystematically varied which actor used which label, which actor labelled the objectsfirst, and which actor sat at which side of the table.
Novel game tasks
Children werepresented with four such trials in which the two actorsdemonstrated a simple novel game act in different ways. Acrossc hildren, it was systematicallyv aried which actor played the game in which way,which actor played first, and which actor sat at which side of the table. Similar games as in ar ecent study on children'sn ormative understanding of simple game rules were used (Rakoczy et al.,2 008; Study 1). For example, in one game called 'Daxing' the objectsw ere as tyrofoamb oard with a gutter at one endand abuilding block, as well as awooden stick which could be used as ak ind of bat (for the other tasks, see Appendix A). E1 first showed the objectst ot he child and explained'Look, with this one can play agame. It is called 'Daxing'.And later on it'syour turntodax.But first we'll watch amovie of the boy and the man'. Then E1 and the child watched the movie. In the movie actor 1(theadult model forhalf of the children, the child model forthe other half) said he wasgoing to dax, took the stick and pushed the building block over the board into the gutter; actor 2thensaid 'No, this is how daxing goes' and put the block on the board and lifted it so that the block slid down into the gutter; Actor 1s aid 'No, this is how daxing goes', acted according to his way again,and then actor 2r epeated his turn.
After the movie still picturesofeach actorperforming his act remained on the screen as am emory aid.E 1r eminded the child who had done what (by pointing to each still picture in turn,saying 'He did it like this'/'And he did it like that'),handed her the objects and told heritwas her turntodax now.After the child hadperformed her act, Max the puppeta ppeared and asked whether it wash is turnn ow.U sually,t he child invited Max to have his turn, and if not E1 dids o. E1 then turneda way and wrotes omething down, and Max announced that he wasg oing to dax, and performed an action twice (each time fora pproximately 20 s): in the experimental condition,t his was the act performed previously by the child model, and in the control condition the puppetacted as the adult model had acted before. Eachc hild receivedablock of two experimental condition trials and two control trials (order counterbalanced across children).
Observational and coding procedure Sessions were videotaped and records weret ranscribed and then coded by as ingle observer.F or each ageg roup, an additional observerc oded the novel game tasks of ar andomly selected 20% of all sessions forr eliability.
Novel game trials: Imitation
Children'sown actions when given the game objectswere coded into one of fivejointly exhaustive categories: 'like adult model' (child performs the full act of the adult model); 'partly like adult model' (child performs ap arto ft he act of the adult model; e.g., in Daxing lifts the boardb ut does not let the block slide down completely); 'like child model' (child performs the full act of the child model); 'partlyl ike child' (child performs apartofthe act of the child model); 'other' (child does not performany of the above). Inter-rater reliability on this measure wase xcellent (3-year-olds: weighted k ¼ : 83/4-year-olds: weighted k ¼ : 99).
Novel game trials: Responses to the puppet For coding,t he test phase of each task was divided into six subphases (before, during and after each of the two act tokens of Max).For each phase, all relevant intervention actions and utterances of the child in responsetothe puppet'sbehaviour were carefully described and given one of the following codes. (1) Normative protest:the child clearly intervenedi nanormative way,m aking use of normative vocabulary( e.g., 'No! It does not go like this!').
(2) Imperative protest:t he child expressed an imperative to Max withoutusing normative vocabulary, either in the negative (e.g., 'No! Not in this hole!') or in the positive (e.g., 'Take the stick!').
(3) Hints of protest:this code was given when the child respondedinaway reminiscent of protest,but not clearly enough foreither of the above categories. In this category, fell pointing or gesturing towardst he missing object,giving the 'missing' object to Max, physicallypreventing an action by Max, and doingapartofthe action Max was omitting.Inter-rater reliability was excellent (age 3, weighted k ¼ : 98; age4,weighted k ¼ : 98). Eachtask then receivedascode the highest code that appeared in its subphases (e.g., if in agiven task achild produced one action qualifying as normative protest and one qualifying as hints of protest,the task gotasits overall code 'normative protest').
Novel label trials
Children'sa nswerst ot he test questions 'Whati st his?' were scored as 'correct'i ft he child followed the adult actor'slabel, incorrect if she followed the peer actor.Ifchildren did not unambiguously chooseo ne of the labels,this was coded as 'other'.
Results

Novel game tasks: Imitation
The sum scoreso ft he completeo rp artial imitations of either model in the four novel game trials are depicted in Figure 1 . Forstatistical purposes, only completeimitations of either model weret aken into account. Accordingly,d ifference scoresw ere computed between the number of trials in which children completely imitated the adult (0-4)and the number of trials in which theyc ompletely imitated the child (0-4). Children imitated the adult model significantly more often than the child model: the sum of these values over the four novelgame taskswas significantly greater than zero ( t ð 47Þ¼5 : 30, p , : 01), with no difference between ageg roups ( t ð 46Þ¼0 : 67, p ¼ : 51).
Novel game tasks: Responses to the puppet
The mean sum scores over the two tasks per condition fort he different response categories are depicted in Figure 2 . Fors tatistical analysis, only normative and imperative protest were taken into consideration (the third category, hints of protest, was not convincing enough an indicator of normative awareness).
First, on aconservative measure, a2ð ageÞ £ 2 ð condition Þ ANOVA on the mean sum scoreso f normative protest was computed. It yielded am ain effect of condition such that children intervened morei nt he experimentalt han in the control condition ( F ð 1 ; 46Þ¼18: 52, p , : 01),but no effect forage ( F ð 1 ; 46Þ¼1 : 02, p ¼ : 32) and no ageX condition interaction effect ( F ð 1 ; 46Þ¼0 : 06, p ¼ : 80).
Second, on am ore liberal measure (mean sum score of tasks per condition in which children produced normative protest or imperative protest responses), a 2 ð ageÞ £ 2 ð conditionÞ ANOVA yielded only amain effect of condition ( F ð 1 ; 46Þ¼5 : 54, p , : 05), but again no effect fora ge ( F ð 1 ; 46Þ¼0, p ¼ 1) and no ageXcondition interaction effect ( F ð 1 ; 46Þ¼0 : 15, p ¼ : 70).
Novel label tasks
The sum scores of trials in which children adopted the label from either model are also depicted in Figure 1 . Difference scores (between the sum of trials in which children followed the adult model and the sum of trial in which children followed the child model) were not differentf rom zero ( t ð 47Þ¼0 : 08, p ¼ : 94), and were notd ifferent between the ageg roups ( t ð 46Þ¼0 : 24, p ¼ : 81). 
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Discussion Summaryo ft he present findings Previous researchhad shownthat children from age3to 5engageinselective learning as af unction of model characteristics, preferring adults over peers, fore xample. Another line of previous researchhad shown that children from around 2to3engagein what could be called 'normative learning'; that is, theyi mitativelyl earnr ule-governed activities from adults and understandt hem as normativelys tructured (as indicated most clearly in their third party critique and protest). Against the background of these two lines of inquiry, the present study lookeda ts elective normative learning in the domain of playing games.The guiding questions were: how general is young children's selective learning from adults over peers( beyond the domain of linguistic learning)? And is early selective learning normativelys tructured? That is, do young children understand what theyselectively imitate in normative terms as the correct/appropriate thing to do?
The present results clearly show that in fact young children (3-and 4-year-olds alike) do engagei ns elective learning from adult over peer modelso utside of the domain of language learning, namely in the domain of games.T his result is in line with recent findings of selective imitation of simple instrumentalacts from adults over peer models (Zmyi, Daum,P rinz, &A schersleben, 2008) . And the present results show that such selective learning of game acts is normatively structured: children not only acted like the adult model more often than like the child model, but theyalso tended to criticize at hird party as incorrect whens he acted like the child model. Thisr esult is in line with some recent findings that somewhato lder children (4-5 years) learns electively and in normatively structuredw ays from reliable over unreliable models (Rakoczy et al., 2 009) . Learning words from adults versus peers Before we turntothe broader implications of this central result, one surprisingfinding of the present study needs to be discussed: children showed selective learning only when it came to game activities, but not when it came to learning new words. That is, the present study fails to replicate the pattern of results by Jaswal and Neely(2006) . It is currently not clear what the grounds are fort hese discrepant findings regarding word learning. One potential concernw ith the present method was that during the making of the videos, the adult adaptedh is way of speaking( pronouncing the words, etc.) as much as possible to the child model'sw ay in order to make the two models as comparable as possible. However,that might have traded comparability fornaturalness (the adult might have soundeda rtificial), and that might be ar eason why children did not preferentially learnfrom him. Afollow-up study,however,failed to find evidence for this. This study used pictures of the two models and asked childrenwho theywould ask aboutthe name of an object (a method widely used in this area, adopted from Koenig & Harris, 2005b; VanderBorght &J aswal, 2009 ),but still, 3-and 4-year-olds did not show any preference (and only 5-year-olds did; see Appendix B). Anotherpossibility is that a methodological difference between the present study and Jaswala nd Neely'ss tudy is responsible forthe diverging results, namely the inclusion of afamiliarization period: in contrast to the current study,J aswal and Neely always hadafi rstp hasew here both models labelled known objectsd ifferentlyb ut correctly (e.g., 'sneakers' and 'shoes'), and in which children wereasked whether someonehad said something wrong.Merely asking such aq uestion might already sensitize childrent ot he very possibility of mistakes, and that might be areason why children in the Jaswal and Neely study might have been more 'normativelya lert', so to speak. Another follow-up study,h owever,i n which we included such af amiliarization phase, failed to produce evidence fort his suggestion (3-and 4-year-olds still didn ot prefer one of the models; see AppendixC ). In sum, then, it remains unclear at present how the divergence between these different studies can be accounted for, and future studies areneeded to further explore potential explanations.I ts hould be noted, however,t hat selective word learning wasn ot the focus of the present workata ll, but rather serveda saframe of reference.
Selective learningfrom adults versuschildren in broader perspective
The focus of the present study was on children'sl earning of game actions,a nd it is remarkable that in this areau nder consideration here( despite the negative findings regarding word learning) children from age3showed ac lear patterno fs elective learning. When it comes to rule-governed activities, childrenfrom early on thus seem to have ad efault tendency to preferentially learntop lay the game from adults. But what does that mean? What is such selectivity based on? Looking just at imitation data leaves open an umber of rather lower-level explanations:( i) children could just view the adult demonstration as an implicit command towards the child 'Do it like this!' to be blindly obeyed. Or (ii) theyc ould just see the adult as performing as omehow preferable idiosyncratic act theyi ndividually copy' Id ow hat you did'. On the basis of such lower-level interpretations, however,w ew ould not expectt he child to have any specific expectations what otherswill or should do (weknow from recent researchthat even1 -year-olds do note xpecti diosyncratic preferences to generalize across individuals; Graham, Stock, &H enderson, 2006; Henderson &G raham, 2005) .
In addition to mereimitation, however,the present findings revealthat children do have such normative expectations: theye xpect others should performa ctions in the way the adult has shown, and theynormativelyintervene in cases of deviations from this standard. Such ap atterno fg eneralization beyond the first person case seems incompatible with lower-level accounts along the lines of (i) and (ii). Rather,w hat the findings suggest is that children engageinselective learning with anormative structure, viewing the action selectivelyl earned from the adult in normative terms as the appropriate, correct one everyone should follow.
This stillleaves open, however,acrucial question, namely what children'sselective learning from the adult is based on. It could be that (iii) children consider adults more competent models and transmitters of cultural knowledgea nd therefore assume the adult way of playing is the correct one. But it is also possible that children'sg rasp of the situation is somewhatl ess sophisticated. For example, (iv) children might have a generalized assumption that adults should be followed by everyone -w ithout further reason (e.g., because theyare competent,knowledgeable, or reliable). The present data alone, and previous data of selective learning cannot decide between these options. But two other recent studies suggest that childrendonot assume adults should always be followed without further reason, but rather that preschoolers' preference foradults as sources of knowledgei sq uite flexible and sophisticated and therefore not readily compatible with (iv). First, in aw ord learning task, whena na dult repeatedly proved incompetent and ac hild competent,c ompetence came to trump age, and children reversed their initial preference fort he adult (Jaswal &Neely,2006) .Second, fors ome areas (e.g., questions about child toys) children have been found to reasonably rely more on peerst han on adults although theyp refer adults when it comest oq uestions, for example, of the nutritional values of food (VanderBorght &J aswal, 2009) .
Several questions,t hen,r emain to be clarified by future research. First of all, even given that children'spreference forcertain kinds of models is quite flexible (adapting as af unction of previous historya nd domain, fore xample), what do theyc onsider responsible forthe fact that this model is to be preferred? Is it competence? Or might it be somethingl esss ophisticated, somethingl ikeaproto-concepto f' general fitness/suitability'? Such ap ossibility is highlighted, fore xample, by recent findings that children view physicallystrongeractorsasgenerallymorepreferable in all kinds of areas, e.g., word learning (Fusaro, Corriveau, &Harris, 2009) . Do theythink these actors are stronger and in addition (or therefore?) more knowledgeable? Or do theyr ather ascribe an as yet undifferentiated disposition -p erhaps hard to grasp with our adult conceptual scheme -t hat refers to general suitability?
Another related question concerns the broader developmental course of children's selective normative learning. First, whered oes this selective learning comef rom?I s there such athing as abiological disposition to distinguish betweenmodels of different characteristics (such as age)? Or is the disposition to preferentiallylearnfrom different kinds of models graduallya cquired?S econd,h ow is subsequent development to be characterized? In particular,h ow does this selectivity develop towards more flexibility and sophistication? Is there at first arather domain-general presumption of competence in adults? Or are theree arly on already areas where children consider peersm ore competent memberso ft he (sub)c ulture?S ome studies suggest that early infants in some domains might actually imitate more from peersthan from adults (e.g., Ryalls, Gul, &Ryalls, 2000) -but if there is such apattern, is this based on presumed competence in favour of peers, or just on preference and sympathy? Andhow then do childrenlearnto differentiate what kind of model knows best aboutwhatk ind of domain?
This connects to broader questionsi nt his area to be addressed in future research: how do childrenc omet od ifferentiate between areas that are subject to normative considerations from those that are not? And how do theyc ome to learnw hat model characteristics are relevant forlearning in suchdifferent areas (competence is relevant in normativeareas, whereas similarity in taste, forexample, is relevant in areas that deal more with personal preferences). Similarly, how do children come to learn in whichsituations there is something general, conventional and normativetobelearned, and in whichnot? And finally, how do theyc ome to distinguish different kinds of normsp ertaining to differentdomains, suchaspurelyconventionalversus moral norms (see Turiel, 1983) ?
Appendix A
Appendix B
Follow-upStudy 1: Novel label tasks without video
Participants
Sixteen3 -year-oldc hildren (34-38m onths),s ixteen 4-year-old children (46-50 months)a nd nineteen 5-year-old children (58-62 months)w ere included in the final sample.
Design and procedure Following VanderBorght and Jaswal (2009), the two models (the samet wo as in the videos)were represented with photographs. To introducethem, the experimenter (E) told the child the names of the modelsa nd some general features about their lives ('This is an adult, he goes to work everymorning … '/'That is aboy,asold as you, he also goes to day care, just like you … '). Child had no trouble recognizing whowas the adult and who the child.
The novel label taskswas basically administered in the sameway in the main study, except fort he following modification: children sawt he novel object,a nd thent hey were askedt he 'ask' question 'Who would youa sk what this is called?' (asu sedi n studies by Koenigand Harris(2005a) and VanderBorghtand Jaswal (2009)). Regardless of their answer,b oth models named the object differently( to do this,Eanimated the picture and spokef or them in differentv oices) before the standard 'endorse' question 'Whati st his?' wasa sked. Each child thus answered 1' ask' questions and 1' endorse' question on each of the four tasks.
Game
Material Procedure 'Daxing' Styrofoam board with gutter at one side; building block; wooden stick A 1 :u se the stick to push building block across the board into gutter A 2 :l ift board so that building block slides into gutter 'Duping'
Boxw ith small hole in the middle of the top,a nd one black tube attached next to it; redmarbles A 1 :t hrow marbles into the black tube A 2 :t hrow marbles into the small hole 'Miecking' Cardboard box with ab lack tube running down attached to it; On the top there is at rayattached to the cardboardbox which can be used likeacatapult, white 
